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The Optimum Remedy for Constitutional
Breaches: MultiAccessed Civil
Penalties in Equity
Robert C. Fellmeth'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the seminal case of Weeks v. United States,' the prosecution sought to
uphold a conviction where the incriminating evidence was allegedly obtained
through an unconstitutional search and seizure by law enforcement. 2 At the time
of the Weeks trial, there were no effective remedies in place to deter such police
exercises.' Further, the federal mechanism lacked the means to detect, adjudicate,
enjoin, or punish such constitutional violations.' There was no deterrent and,
indeed, little disincentive on police excesses.
Lest our founding document become a repository of dead letters and
hypocrisies, our constitutional checks must be actualized. But the judiciary, with
the important task of providing a check on the other two branches, is inherently
passive. It does not tax or spend, enact laws, or adopt rules applicable outside its
own domain. Its power to interpret the law is confined to cases brought to it by
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1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. See id. at 385-86.
3. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83
IOWA L. REV. 669, 672 (1998) (noting that the exclusionary rule was applied "because it was the only
means by which [police] abuses could be deterred effectively," which suggests that no other deterrents
existed).
4. See id.
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others. Even within this rubric, constitutional doctrines pertaining to ripeness,
mootness, justiciability, advisory opinions, and real controversies limit judicial
check as to those cases it receives. And as to those it may act upon, its power is
largely limited to granting the prayer of a party or refusing it. Accordingly, in
1914, the Weeks Court took the only remedial action it could by overturning the
conviction and ruling that the evidence obtained by law enforcement in violation
of constitutional standards could not be used against a defendant at trial.5 What
other remedy was available to the Court?
Although the Court often lacked enthusiasm for the exclusionary rule, 6 over
the next forty-seven years Congress and state legislatures failed to formulate a more
direct and satisfactory remedy.' Accordingly, in 1961, when the Court faced the
question of applying a remedy to the state courts throughout the nation, it had little
choice.' In Mapp v. Ohio,9 the exclusionary rule as a remedy for constitutional
breaches was extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,' ° and it
has since become the primary means to enforce constitutional compliance by public
officials, particularly police authorities at local, state, and federal levels."
The remedy of excluding evidence for police constitutional transgressions was
not created tabula rasa. Were the Court to have the same broad, proactive
authority as Congress and state legislatures have had and retain, how might it have
proceeded logically? The first thing the Court probably would consider is the
purpose of a remedy: to provide redress for, halt, and, ideally, deter wrongdoing.
A remedy should be measured based on its efficacy in accomplishing its goals
while minimizing collateral harm unrelated to its purposes. As such, if presented
with the problem of the police breaching constitutional standards, a decisionmaker
with comprehensive options would seek a remedy to halt such practices by
providing an effective disincentive sufficiently focused to prevent harm to outside
persons or interests. There are numerous theoretical remedies which might be
measured along such a paradigm, such as sanctions imposed on individual officers,
their police departments, or even the larger political jurisdiction that governs state
agents transgressing applicable standards. These sanctions could involve, for
example, criminal prosecution, damage awards, civil penalties, and employment
5. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389-99.
6. See Penin et al., supra note 3, at 672 (noting the Supreme court's "apparent dislike for the rule"
and the lack of viable options).
7. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (pointing out that a number of states had already
adopted some form of the exclusionary rule by 1961 and citing as significant the California Supreme
Court's claim that it has "'failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions"' (quoting
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955))).
8. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 672 (noting that the Court, in its reluctance, bypassed two
earlier opportunities to extend the rule in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. See id. at 655.
11. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 673 ("[A]s we approach the millennium, the exclusionary rule
remains the primary 'remedy' for police misconduct.").
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sanctions.'" They could be overseen or decided by an agency, a separate court,
existing courts, or an independent citizen review board.13
As discussed below, the exclusionary rule, as a remedy, scores low on both of
the basic criteria for measuring remedy efficacy: it lacks effective connection to
the wrong addressed, 4 and it imposes considerable collateral costs on others. 5 Its
shortcomings make the exclusionary rule less preferred than a long list of options
that more directly impacts the persons engaging in unconstitutional behavior and
that would hold them accountable based on the nature and prior record of such
breaches.' 6  However, before passing judgment on the courts, consider their
position: it is the only remedy they have. The blame for the current reliance on a
remedy, which is not only ineffective, but also imposes considerable external costs,
rests squarely with the Congress and the state legislatures that have the authority
to formulate such options, but have failed to do so. This Article analyzes some of
the current options proposed 7 and concludes that there is an optimum option which
would avoid the external costs of the exclusionary rule, serve its purposes to secure
police compliance with constitutional standards more directly and effectively, and
lie within sufficient judicial control to allow its substitution for the exclusionary
rule.' As outlined below, and in a model statute attached, 9 the best option is a
multiaccessed civil penalty sanction in equity imposed against the department or
the agency employing those who violate such standards.2"
12. See generally id. at 736-53 (discussing the viability of various options to the exclusionary nule).
Note that all of these suggested remedies involve sanctions. The efficacy of sanction versus reward to
influence human behavior is the subject of social psychological examination. The generic advantages
of rewards are considerable because sanctions require ascertainable standards, violation, detection,
adjudication, and imposition. Each of these elements can be difficult to attain when constitutional
standards are applied to the police. Further, persons do not always rationally calculate consequences
when making decisions, and they tend to optimistically estimate the likelihood of sanction. Ironically,
evidence of a sanction's ineffectiveness in influencing police behavior can be seen in the difficulties
faced by the criminal justice system itself in accomplishing compliance with the law among the
citizenry. A more creative range of options, which are beyond the scope of this Article, might explore
how reward systems that are inherently more effective in influencing human behavior could be
employed to stimulate police compliance with constitutional standards.
13. See, e.g., id. at 743-53 (proposing an administrative agency review of alleged constitutional
violations).
14. See infra Part lI.A.
15. See infra Parts ItI-VI.
16. See infra Part ILB.
17. See infra Parts IX-X.
18. See infra Parts XI-XII.
19. See infra Part XM.
20. See infra Parts XI-XII.
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IH. EFFICACY TO PROTECT CIVIL LIBERTIES
Most of the public criticism surrounding the exclusionary rule has emphasized
the collateral cost of disallowing relevant and otherwise admissible evidence.
Critics of the rule argue that it hampers the truth seeking function of the trial and
results in the release of guilty defendants who are then able to prey upon future
victims. But an equally relevant consideration should be the rule's failure to
accomplish the end it seeks. Failing to discuss the rule's efficacy as intended
allows critics to ignore options which may provide an enhanced incentive for police
constitutional compliance. Hence, political discourse often proposes simply the
elimination of the exclusionary rule without a substitute remedy. Other critics
addressing the purpose of the exclusionary rule suggest that existing remedies are
satisfactory. Because the evidence substantially contradicts the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule, the straight elimination advocates have undermined the general
credibility of exclusionary rule critics, including those who favor both the reduction
of collateral consequences and the enhancement of civil liberties. A coequal
critique of the exclusionary rule as an unmeritorious safeguard of constitutional
compliance brings with it the implicit obligation to provide a substitute remedy to
improve that protection.
A. Disincentive Adequacy and Connection to Wrong
In addition to the costs, the exclusionary remedy is singularly unimpressive as
a deterrent to police misconduct. It does not take a reading of the evidence
discussed below to reach such a conclusion. The nature of the remedy itself in the
law enforcement context has serious limitations. Imagine yourself a police officer
who deeply cares about apprehending and punishing criminals. This is the mind
set presumed by the remedy for its efficacy because the worst case scenario is the
failure to secure a conviction. But the reality of law enforcement experience often
means a difficult choice: the breach of a constitutional limit through aggressive
investigation, or the loss of an arrest. Often, the intrusion will create the evidence
warranting arrest. Indeed, that is the very situation relied upon for the exclusionary
rule's efficacy.2 If the denial of evidence suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary
rule is irrelevant to an arrest or a conviction, the sanction will not provide a remedy
for the police officer's conduct. Hence, at its strongest, the sanction will apply
when the evidence is necessary for conviction and, afortiori for arrest.
Imagine then the actual situation of the sanction at its most effective: if the
officer breaches the Constitution and searches prior to adequate probable cause, he
may discover whether there is evidence to arrest; if he does not, someone he
believes may be a criminal will walk. If the officer is wrong and there is no
21. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645 (1961).
926
[Vol. 26: 923, 1999] Optimum Remedy for Constitutional Breaches
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
evidence, then there is no exclusionary rule sanction. If the officer is correct and
discovers evidence, he may then arrest the presumed criminal. Even though this
initial evidence is inadmissible according to the exclusionary rule, the arrest may
lead to other evidence which is found to be independent of the constitutional
breach by the court, including possibly a confession, admissive statements of
others, or evidence from an independent source, and not subject to proscription
under the exclusionary rule. The defendant may plead or suffer conviction
notwithstanding the exclusion of the evidence giving rise to the initial arrest.
Under the worst possible case scenario, the evidence is excluded, and the
defendant walks. But from the police officer's perspective, that would be the likely
result without the constitutional breach. Moreover, even with such an eventuality,
the police officer achieves the arrest of the criminal, fingerprinting, mug shots, the
ignominy of skin search and jailing, and arraignment. Where there is a felony
involved, the officer achieves a preliminary hearing, pretrial motions, and felony
arraignment. Then the defendant is subjected to a trial and often to incarceration
during the entire period leading up to the trial.22
To summarize, the anticriminal orientation of the police officer, which the
exclusionary rule relies upon, precludes its efficacy. It will hurt criminals much
more to subject them to the above listed travails than to allow them to walk in the
here and now of a decision not to search or interrogate. It is conceptually a "heads
I win, tails you lose" proposition.23
The remedy should not lead a rational police officer to be greatly influenced
by its prospect. Apart from this threshold difficulty, the remedy has additional
practical failings.
22. Although the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial for this reason, the police officer knows as
a practical matter that the defendant's counsel will ask that such time be "waived," particularly if there
is a strong case for the exclusion of evidence requiring the defense attorney to prepare appropriately.
23. The remedy can make a rational difference where the officer suffers the dismissal of a case in
comparison to a reasonably expected conviction. That is, the hypothetical police officer will be
relatively disappointed where he has sufficient evidence for a conviction and expects one, only to find
that an unconstitutional search resulted in a dismissal. However, such a scenario ordinarily occurs
where there is evidence which is contaminated gratuitously or unnecessarily by police constitutional
breach. Even here within such a narrow situation, if the evidence already exists for the conviction of
a defendant and the search occurs later and cannot contaminate or lead to its exclusion, the officer
effectively has a free ticket.
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B. Disincentive Coverage: How Many Breaches Does the Rule Address?
The exclusionary rule provides a possible remedy reaching only some
instances of police constitutional breach. In all cases where no incriminating
evidence is found, there will be no sanction because the existing remedy depends
on the exclusion of what is found or learned. Ironically, the searches with the least
justification are likely to dominate these police intrusions, as the lack of resulting
evidence suggests. In all cases where evidence is obtained but there is a confession
or, alternatively, admissible evidence is found, there is not an effective sanction.
In all cases where the defendant pleads or where no motion to exclude is brought,
there will be no sanction.
C. Evidence of Ineffectiveness
One goal of the exclusionary rule is to provide a remedy to discourage
constitutional violations by police.24 The measure of the rule's efficacy to that end
are records of police violative behavior. To what extent is such behavior actually
discouraged? The ideal measurement is an examination of police practices. Where
the police are. respecting the rights of the citizenry, one would expect citizen
approval of them to increase within those high crime communities where most
police and citizen contact occurs. One would expect over time, as an effective
remedy is employed, fewer complaints of abusive behavior by police. One would
expect fewer motions to exclude evidence and certainly fewer such motions
granted. Numerous variables may interfere with such measures, and each has
measurement difficulties. 25 However, is there any evidence that the exclusionary
rule remedy has produced a steadily declining amount of unconstitutional police
intrusions? Are the numbers of motions to exclude declining because of altered
police practices? Is the number of appellate reversals falling based on the remedy's
application (as opposed to looser standards defining constitutionality)? Is there a
more positive perception of police practices within the inner cities of the nation to
indicate growing police compliance with and respect for the constitutional
limitations on their practices? After thirty-seven years, where is the evidence?
24. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657-60.
25. For example, granting fewer motions to exclude evidence or granting fewer appellate reversals
based on erroneous admission of evidence gathered pursuant to constitutional breaches by police can
be influenced by changing definitions of constitutional police practices. The good faith exception, for
example, may lead to fewer motions, dismissals, orreversals, but does it reflect different police practices
and less intrusion into citizen privacy or simply a changing standard for application of the remedy?
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It may be argued persuasively that police today are more carefully selected,
better trained, more professional, more racially integrated, and better educated than
in prior years.26 What is remarkable is the continuing extent of police misbehavior
in the trial and the appellate court record of the nation, despite these encouraging
sociological changes in the police." One would imagine that these sociological
changes combined with an effective remedy would produce greater police
compliance than the current record reveals.
I. COLLATERAL COSTS
The following consequences of the exclusionary rule are termed unintended
"collateral costs" because they are not connected to the primary purpose of the rule,
which is the control of police behavior. All other things being equal, a remedy is
superior to others when it achieves the same or better constitutional compliance
while avoiding or minimizing such costs.
A. System Influence
A criminal sanction is our system's most extreme remedy. It is reserved for
behavior that most endangers our values. Usually, criminal sanctions seek to
protect the weak from private predators, such as the bullies and exploiters who
abuse, attack, and take from children, the elderly, or anyone weaker than
themselves. These serious sanctions are intended to hold persons accountable for
the harm they cause others. But, the criminal justice system is more than a
restitutionary vehicle. Cases are filed in the name of the "People" and reflect the
desire to prevent and deter such harmful acts. Such prevention benefits from the
accountability of persons committing such acts, from their punishment and removal
from society if incorrigible, and from the prevention that flows from deterrence.
That deterrence, in turn, depends largely on the perceived certainty of
punishment. 8
26. See Paul R. Joseph, The Case for the Exclusionary Rule, 14 HUM. RTs. 38,43 (1987) (asserting
that police today are better trained as a result of the exclusionary rule).
27. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 691-711 (summarizing various studies analyzing arrest and
conviction statistics, return of seized property, and suppression motions gauging the effectiveness of
the exclusionary rule and concluding that "Mapp has probably made officers more aware of the Fourth
Amendment, and has increased the number of warrants they obtain, although it is less certain that it has
actually affected their performance of their duties").
28. Arguably, the perceived odds of receiving any punishment at all influence human behavior more
than the severity of the penalty. Where there is perceived certitude of sanction, the sanction need not
be extreme. On the other hand, if one believes apprehension or conviction is unlikely, the nature of the
929
As the criminal justice system becomes burdened by collateral proceedings
culminating in the release of persons who would otherwise be adjudged guilty, that
perceived certitude suffers. This dynamic is not limited by the relatively small
number of persons who are not convicted or whose convictions are reversed due
to operation of the exclusionary rule. As discussed below, many more cases are
affected earlier in the process by the exclusionary rule's prospective application,
particularly in decisions not to file or to take lesser pleas. Moreover, it is the
perception of risk that affects risk assessment by those considering criminal acts,
and the numerous contests involving exclusion of evidence, regardless of results,
inevitably affect that perception.
Collateral proceedings to determine the wrongdoing of police tend to have two
damaging consequences in this regard. First, they introduce an additional variable
that can preclude conviction and sanction. The hypothetical criminal already
knows that he is going to have to be apprehended and that evidence must show him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, a third element is added: the police must
not have breached any of the many and often confusing doctrines of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and possibly their state
counterparts. Aware that only a small percentage of criminal acts result in
apprehension, this additional variable further lessens the fear of sanction and its
accompanying deterrent effect.
Second, the introduction of police behavior examination in the very same
proceeding where the defendant is being judged introduces additional elements of
"gamesmanship" that further undermine respect for the judicial system. 29 In most
cases, a guilty defendant hurt someone. At the risk of a maudlin expression, in a
civilized society people should care about one another. Where harm is caused, is
there value to contrition, apology, request for forgiveness, and a chance to "make
it up?" Arguably, such instincts are among our most redeeming features as
humans, and a society properly nurtures them, or at least provides a chance for their
manifestation. Instead, we oft times turn the criminal trial and the appellate process
into a "them against us" process, in which the evils of the state are aligned against
the virtually defenseless victim-not the citizen raped, beaten, robbed, or murdered,
but the defendant.
Concededly, there is little such additional cost where the guilt of the defendant
is legitimately contested; indeed, there will then be a vigorous contest as there
should be. But the criminal trial is not so confined, and appellate practice is less
limited to bonafide contentions.30
penalty may not be influential.
29. Of course, constitutional breaches by the police also undermine legitimate respect for the
system. However, we are not implying toleration of a police violation, but rather dealing with the
violation in a separate proceeding with its own purpose and customized sanction. See infra Part XIII
30. Ironically, one serious result from our fictionalization of such a contest in a large number of
cases is the failure of some legitimately innocent defendants to have an effective hearing. This
approbation is particularly applicable to the appellate process, where writs and appeals appear to be de
930
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B. The Truth-Seeking Trial
The parties with a stake in the outcome extend beyond the police and the
criminal. The immediate, prior, and perhaps uncharged victims have a stake, those
who may be victims in the future have a stake, and society at large has a stake.
Apart from the abstract interest of the people in compliance with their enacted
laws, there are practical impacts: a system of reliable and predictable guilt
determination adds to our security and our willingness to comply with laws that we
may be able to violate successfully but for our own self-restraint and categorical
respect for our public institutions.
Every political jurisdiction acknowledges the importance of the criminal
justice system in committing substantial resources to achieve an accurate judgment.
We care about applying the law to what happened, and have devoted resources and
thoughtful procedures to determine prior events, including an adversarial process
in which the state's allegations can be challenged as warranted, with mechanisms
ranging from notice of charges and evidentiary rules, to the right to counsel and
cross examination. We want to know the empirical truth with as much certainty as
possible. Knowing who did what, when, how, and why allows us to apply the law
justly.
The exclusionary rule can remove otherwise reliable evidence from the triers
of fact entrusted to determine what happened. 3' Accordingly, such exclusion can
compromise the basic truth seeking function of the trial and may stimulate unjust
results.32 Defenders of the exclusionary rule point to the small number of
convictions overturned based on the exclusion of admissible evidence, particularly
rigeur for all. When there are so many, what happens to the few that legitimately deserve careful
scrutiny and reversal? Do such cases suffer credibility contamination from their inclusion in a large
potpourri of similarly framed, but disingenuous arguments and contentions?
31. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 672 (stating that the exclusionary rule excludes highly
probative evidence in a criminal trial).
32. American jurisprudence emphasizes a possible need to let many go free to prevent the wrongful
conviction of a few. However, the exclusionary rule does not juxtapose risk of wrongful incarceration
against possible freedom for the guilty. The latter is an inescapable choice between two alternatives
which influences the burden of proof and certainty required for conviction. Rather, the exclusionary
rule is intended to achieve a result outside of the convict or not convict paradigm-the control of police
behavior. Where that control is achievable by means other than the exclusionary rule, it may be
achieved free from the distortion of trial fact finding capacity. The preference for freeing some who are
guilty over incarcerating even a few who are innocent derives from the horror of punishing the innocent.
It does not minimize the harm flowing from the former, which can have its own horrible consequences
and which warrants strong justification if undertaken.
when subtracting those who are convicted on retrial or who plead.33 They argue
that the present remedy works without substantial inequity overall.34
One problem with the de minimis harm contention is the implication that the
rule provides little deterrence to constitutional violations by police. The
exclusionary rule assumes that the police care about securing conviction and that
the exclusion of relevant evidence, in threatening that interest, provides a powerful
inducement to comply with the Constitution. However, if there is little collateral
harm because defendants suffer close to the same fate, notwithstanding the
exclusionary rule, how much of a deterrent can it be? Nor does an advantage flow
from disparate police perception because those involved in a case generally know
its outcome. If there is little outcome change based on their investigative
techniques, why should they be thusly influenced?
C. Preliminary Decisions to Issue
In fact, the exclusionary rule impacts police behavior more than the low
proportion of "walk free" defendants might indicate.35 The overall impact of the
rule in compromising accurate and consistent punishment for criminal offenses is
substantially more extensive than is indicated by the studies discussed below. 6
The studies generally fail to accurately measure the most important part of the
exclusionary rule's impact-decisions to arrest, file cases ("issue" cases by offices
of the district attorney), and plea bargains occurring prior to trial based on police
investigative technique issues. In each of these three decision-making arenas, the
impact of the exclusionary rule is far more momentous than dismissals or reversals
at the more visible and countable trial or appellate court levels.
Supervising police and public prosecutors recognize the possibility of evidence
exclusion. Prosecutors do not relish losing cases because of the failure to gain the
admission of relevant evidence. Although a police official may be at fault,
prosecutors often view their task as convicting persons who are guilty. Further, a
professional attorney is properly trained to evaluate the facts and apply the law,
which includes the exclusionary rule. If a prosecutor, functioning as "issue
deputy" (assigned the task of issuing or filing criminal pleadings), recognizes
constitutional problems in a police investigation, he or she may refuse to issue the
case or issue only those counts where the evidence is relatively uncontaminated.
33. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 585,606 (stating that the exclusionary rule has a "truly marginal effect on
the criminal court system").
34. See id. at 607 ("If these minuscule costs are compared with the benefits... I can only conclude
that there should be no change in the status quo.").
35. See infra Part V1.
36. See infra Part VU.
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D. Impact on Plea Bargaining
Following the "issuance" of a criminal case (court filing after an arrest),
typically by an office of the district attorney, defense counsel will become
involved. After obtaining discovery, the defense counsel examines the record for
any evidence of police breach across a complex domain of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment case law. As the data below indicate, the resolution of most cases
occurs through plea bargains rather than trials." Often, while arguing for a plea
bargain, defense counsel includes, and often focuses upon, the investigation
infirmities, which may jeopardize the conviction of their clients because of the
application of the exclusionary rule. Such arguments are considered legitimate
because the strength of a case is a major factor in compromising counts or penalty.
In my experience as a deputy district attorney, and in working with prosecutors
and law enforcement over the past thirty years, the influence of police
constitutional error is considerable on decisions to issue a case, which crimes to
charge, and the bargained disposition of a case. As the high percentage of cases
subject to plea bargain disposition that I have witnessed suggest, their total impact
vastly exceeds the influence of those few cases subject to exclusionary rule
reversal. Accordingly, a reasonable conclusion supports the notion that the
deterrent impact on police behavior from the rule's prospective application may
somewhat outweigh the indications offered by an occasional trial dismissal or
appellate reversal. However, the collateral negative impact of the remedy through
arbitrary, inconsistent, and inadequate application of law to the acts of defendants
is also substantially more extensive than prior studies which count post filing
proceedings.
E. Qualitative Harm
The exclusionary rule causes a qualitatively different kind of harm than the
police behavior paradigm it purportedly addresses. First, the police assuredly care
about securing the convictions of those they arrest and may empathize with crime
victims; however, suffering the death of a child, the loss of years of savings, or the
diminishment of health from a violent rape or assault may not be sufficiently
represented through the surrogate of police concern about convicting law violators.
The persons bearing the direct damage from these crimes are bona fide civilian
third parties who suffer consequences qualitatively different and arguably more
profound than do the police through possible impacts of the exclusionary rule. And
37. See infra Part VII.
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beyond the parties and future victims to the extent the exclusionary rule leads to a
less certain sanction, the rule may undermine the general perceived likelihood of
punishment. As argued above, such a reduction lessens to some extent the overall
deterrent impact of the criminal justice system vis-a-vis potential law violators in
general.
Second, one of the purposes of the criminal justice system is to treat citizens
consistently. Ideally, a violation of law yields a predictable penalty, applicable
regardless of who committed the crime, and varying based only on rational criteria,
such as a record of prior offenses. Ideally, results should not vary based on
arbitrary factors unrelated to the acts of the defendant. The exclusionary rule
introduces such an element. Two defendants with the same record and same
defenses committing the same crime are likely to be treated differently where the
police erred in obtaining evidence as to one. Where both defendants have
competent defense counsel, the likely exclusion of evidence allows a dismissal or
the negotiation of a substantially different outcome for one defendant. Such a
disparate outcome is not an aberration under common application of the
exclusionary rule; rather, the failure of counsel to obtain a substantially different
result with such an available (exclusionary) defense would be viewed by the
defense bar as substandard practice.
Some supporters of the exclusionary rule view the trial through the prism of
"game" mentality, where the game has assumed a role beyond its purposes. The
contest is played out between a defendant and the state, which is represented by the
police. But there are other parties not represented in such a contest-past victims,
future victims, and the rule of law. While the rule of law includes compliance by
the police, altering criminal justice outcomes because of police transgressions
impose serious collateral costs on third parties.
We are all in some sense isolated from each other. Many of us do not know
our neighbors well. Someone two doors down can be the victim of a horrible
crime, and we might not even know about it. It is difficult for us, each in our own
individual cubicles, to measure the total impact of the exclusionary rule based on
the release of dangerous felons; however, prosecutors and the police have some
idea of the rule's impact. Although the exclusionary rule was an effort by the
Court to "set an example" by allowing the benign Mrs. Mapp to escape prosecution
for some racy photographs in her home,38 the exclusionary rule has produced a
system enabling thousands of dangerous felons to avoid prosecution or, more
likely, escape with a plea to substantially lesser charges.39 Statistically, those
released after imprisonment are rearrested an average of 2.8 times each for offenses
over the two years of freedom following release.' Those who are equally guilty
and are released before trial are not likely to be a less recidivist population.
38. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,644 (1961).
39. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 676.
40. See NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN
CALIFORNIA 15-16 (1982).
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However, if one wishes to measure the harm created by the application of the
exclusionary rule from the fidelity of the trial as a seeker of truth to the crimes that
are never prosecuted, or to the victims of the crimes by those who were let go as
a result, its harmful impact is qualitatively momentous.
IV. OTHER COLLATERAL COSTS: COURT BURDEN AND CIVIL
PROCEEDING DELAY
The exclusionary rule is a critical defense tactic used to win dismissal or to
increase the bargaining power of a defendant. Many cases are litigated into pretrial
motions or to trial because of the uncertainty created by possible exclusion of
evidence.4' Posttrial appeals and writs are often based on similar contentions of
police wrongdoing warranting exclusion of evidence.42 In addition, the passage of
three strikes legislation in California and other jurisdictions has made felony
criminal trials more likely given the reduced downside for defendants in "rolling
the dice at trial." Therefore, any remotely reasonable contention of police
wrongdoing that may invoke the exclusion of evidence is properly and commonly
raised by competent defense counsel. Hence, exclusionary rule related proceedings
are not necessarily invoked based on their own merits, but are stimulated by the
momentous stakes of a defendant quite apart from the privacy intrusion issues of
the constitutional breach.
The separation of constitutional breach cases from criminal proceedings will
have one important impact on court workload. It is likely to produce fewer
contentions of police misconduct absent the false stimulation of the criminal
proceedings to which they are bonded by the exclusionary rule.
The burden created by often de rigeur litigation of ancillary matters within
criminal cases is difficult to quantify with precision. However, criminal matters are
given priority over civil cases. The burden on the courts from increases in criminal
filings, trials, and appeals has been momentous over the past decade. In California,
for example, the criminal proportion of superior court cases has increased fifteen
percent over the past decade and thirty-eight percent over the past two decades (to
1995-1996).' 3 Meanwhile, general civil filings rose seventeen percent from 1975-
41. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 677.
42. See id.
43. See 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 1998 STATE COURT OUTLOOK: ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1998)
(visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/98sco-2.pdf>. Note that the
criminal and civil filings together have amounted to 30% to 40% of the total caseload. See id.
However, the remaining cases are dominated by dissolution, juvenile, and petition actions, many of
which are handled by specialized and more summary proceedings. See id. The criminal and civil
filings that involve possible jury trials tax superior court resources most profoundly, as indicated by the
1976 to 1985-1986, but have now fallen a remarkable forty-three percent over the
past decade.' Ten years ago, civil filings were about three times the number of
criminal cases; now, they are approaching parity. The priority of criminal cases
and their back log has created delays in civil trials. Although major efforts have
been made to expedite civil cases, particularly in California over the past five years,
as of 1995-1996, about one-half do not reach trial within one year, and twenty
percent do not reach trial within three years at the superior court level.45 Having
to wait over one year to resolve a civil dispute is not an ideal dispute resolution
system in any society. The time and expense of the civil process is a serious barrier
to small businesses and individuals seeking recompense for wrongs. Were a
reallocation of judicial resources of even ten percent made to civil proceedings,
additional court attention to civil matters such as discovery abuses and delaying
tactics might make the "under one year" time to trial goal for cases filed more
achievable. '6
At the appellate level, the delay and crowd-out from criminal cases is more
pronounced. Here, courts of appeals commonly have a three year wait from notice
of appeal to final decision in civil cases. In California, the fastest ninety percent
of civil cases took 388 days from final briefing to decision in 1992-1993, and in the
most recent available statistics, the figure reached 622 days from 1996 to 1997.' 7
This does not include the ten percent of cases lasting longer or the substantial time
from notice of appeal to certification of the record to opening, responding and reply
briefs, which can add six to eighteen months to this total. Understandably, because
of the fact of incarceration and their generically higher priority, the fastest ninety
percent of criminal cases took 283 days from full briefing to final decision in 1996-
1997.4
The increased workload is such that although the decisions are taking longer,
less time is spent on each. In California, the total number of dispositions by written
opinion has gone from 9000 to 14,000 over the past decade, while the number of
justices has not kept pace: the workload per authorized justice in 1987-1988 was
125 cases filed and was 182 in the most recently reported year of 1996-1997.
49
Much of the increase over the past decade is due to criminal filings with
exclusionary rule related issues occupying a major part of that caseload's
contentions: in 1992-1993 there were 7195 notices of appeal in criminal cases, and
allocation of relatively small numbers of judges to family and juvenile courts. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 45.
46. The California Judicial Council's goal is to reduce the time between filing and trial to less than
one year for 90% of all cases filed in superior court. See id. Although new procedures and timelines
have cut time to trial significantly, the state remains far short of that goal, with 47% of cases brought
to trial within one year (1993-1994) and 52% in the most recently reported year (1995-1996). See id.
47. See id. at 57. Note that the Judicial Council counts the "90"' percentile" time. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 56.
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by 1995-1996 the number had increased to 8818.50 The California numbers cited
are not aberrational; rather, they infer what experienced criminal and civil litigators
in courts throughout the nation know well: our civil litigation system is a disgrace
in terms of cost and delay, and part of the problem is the crowd-out by a burgeon-
ing criminal caseload. While much of the criminal caseload would remain even
with the removal of exclusionary rule litigation, a substantial portion of the
criminal caseload would be directly impacted because there would be fewer issues
to decide, fewer cases on appeal, and more cases subject to plea bargaining based
strictly on evidence relevant to guilt or innocence.
If police misconduct cases were separated from criminal litigation, the
reduction in caseload could flow from two sources. As argued above, the incentive
of collateral gain for a criminal defendant as to his underlying offense would be
gone.5 Trials would occur less often with less uncertainty in outcome stimulating
defendants to gratuitously "roll the dice." In addition, if a substitute remedy
separate from the exclusionary rule were more effective at deterring police
constitutional offenses, there might be fewer cases spawned at origin-those now
deriving from unconstitutional investigation tactics.
A further, important system benefit arises if police misconduct cases stand on
their own. Assuming a substitute remedy exists with sufficient incentives to
produce deterrence where constitutional wrongs now occur, fewer, more focused
cases will result. Cases will no longer ride the coattails of criminal proceedings
where contentions and appeals occur as a matter of course. This enhanced quality
feature is important. Currently, because of the numerous motions, writs, and
appeals filed in an attempt to invoke the exclusionary rule based on police error
theories, cases with stronger defenses implying innocence may be discounted by
the system.52 Where the flow of cases is a flood, the odds grow that the few but
important legitimately meritorious defenses will not receive the attention they
warrant.53 The credibility of the entire genre of filings becomes suspect, and the
trial or the reviewing court develops a mindset to deny motions, writs, or appeals.
However, a smaller flow of cases focusing on the application of the law to what the
defendant did results in a rich vein of meritorious allegations and stimulates their
recognition.54
50. See id. at 58.
51. See supra Part Il.
52. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 677.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 751-52.
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V. OTHER COLLATERAL COSTS: THE PROBLEM OF STANDARD
DENIGRATION
It is a longstanding cliche among attorneys that "hard facts make bad law."
Cases where following "the law" produce inequitable outcomes may be avoided by
ignoring the law or by altering the law to allow for an equitable result. Virtually
every exclusionary rule case involves the equitable prospect of criminal release for
offenses that are often terrible and likely of repetition." That premise is the
context in which the Constitution is being interpreted for the protection of citizen
privacy interests. It is not an advantageous context for those legitimately
concerned about controlling police abuse.56
Arguably, the political unpopularity of "the constable erred, free the prisoner"
combined with the equities in individual cases have had a palpable role in softening
constitutional constraints on police investigations." This softening is particularly
stark in California. Prior to 1982, California set constitutional standards under the
state constitution on an independent basis from the federal court interpretation of
the United States Constitution.5" Some of this difference had a basis in the distinct
features of the California Constitution, most notably in Article I, Section 1, which
is the guarantee of privacy rights.59 But most of the independent state cases
decided in the 1970s and the 1980s involved the interpretation of California's
direct counterpart search and seizure and confession provisions.' The federal
court interpretation of similar concepts was markedly different and unerringly more
accommodating to the police.6' Whatever the merits of each approach, the
electorate responded negatively to the California state court approach.
First, in 1982, the state enacted the Victims' Bill of Rights initiative amending
the state constitution to require the admission of all "relevant evidence" in a
criminal case.62 This effectively eliminated the exclusionary rule under the state
constitution, which meant that only the federal application of the exclusionary rule
in Mapp would apply to effectuate exclusion, which in turn must be based on
federal interpretation of the federal constitution. The state could no longer apply
the exclusionary rule based on its different interpretation of California's constitu-
55. See id. at 676.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 677.
58. See People v. Cahill, 853 P.2d 1037, 1091 (Cal. 1993).
59. See CAL. CONST. art I., § I ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are... pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.").
60. See People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 747-48 (Cal. 1979); People v. Zelinsky, 594 P.2d 1000,
1004-05 (Cal. 1979); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130, 147-49 (Cal. 1978); People v. Scott, 546 P.2d 327,
330-31 (Cal. 1976); People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-15 (Cal. 1975).
61. For federal cases that California declined to apply, see, for example, United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
62. See CAL CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (receiving approval by the voters on June 8, 1982).
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tion. The enactment of this initiative effectively reversed an extensive body of case
law and released the police to the more flexible federal standards.
Second, in November 1986, the California electorate fired a shot heard around
the courts of the nation, defeating at the polls the three State Supreme Court
justices most closely identified with exclusionary rule application-Chief Justice
Rose Bird, Justice Cruz Reynoso, and Justice Joseph Grodin.63 That defeat
involved the highly charged accusation in statewide advertising that these three
justices had restricted the police excessively and had excluded evidence, resulting
in the release of dangerous criminals ready to commit additional crimes.6
At the federal level, the standards guiding police investigative techniques are
becoming increasingly complex. Police investigative techniques are primarily
guided by doctrines allowing police searches under numerous conditions.
Categories for permissible searches without warrant have been created, such as the
basic "search incident to an arrest" or "searches by consent." However, specific
doctrines for a bewildering array of situations have also been created, including the
following: the "stop and frisk," the "emergency doctrine," the "murder scene
exception," "border searches," "vehicular roadblocks," "airport searches,"
"regulatory searches," "vehicle stops and searches," "inventory searches,"
"searches incident to incarceration," "searches by consent," seizure of items in
"plain sight," "overflight observation," and "trash searches." Courts analyze
threshold concepts, such as "reasonable expectation of privacy" and other
doctrines, when creating permissible searches without warrant. Although there are
arguments to commend or condemn each category of permissible searches without
warrant, they are generally drawn in the context of allowing a search that might
otherwise be condemned, and the extension of that allowance to a category of
police practice. These doctrines give advance notice of permissible searches
without warrant. However, it is instructive that very little case law has developed
with malum prohibitum presumption (for example a "Bedroom Privacy" rule), a
"Violation of Bodily Integrity" line, or an "Interference with Family Relations
without Notice" bar. Would the courts be more likely to limit the police conduct
if the remedy did not involve the politically explosive and often individually
inequitable consequences of excluding relevant evidence and reversing a criminal
conviction?
939
63. See Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986,
§ 1,at 8.
64. See id.
Civil libertarians see the "good faith exception ' as the culmination of
standard softening of the individual's Fourth Amendment rights against unreason-
able searches.6 But civil libertarians naively fail to connect the softening of the
standard with the exclusionary rule. Such an exception rests on the false premise,
which is accepted and promoted by criminal defense counsel, that a trial is a
"contest" between the defendant and the state. Seeing only a two party conflict in
a multiparty world, the cases serve to compare wrongdoing. If the defendant's
wrong occurred in the context of police wrongdoing, then the higher expectations
we legitimately have for the more powerful state should lead us to punish the police
by rewarding the defendant. After all, the defendant's arrest and litigation made
possible the detection and sanctioning of this larger societal wrong.
If one accepts such a psychological approach, then one stands to suffer a good
faith exception consequence. The theory of this exception is that the police made
a mistake, but did not commit a wrong out of evil intent. Hence, where the
defendant commits an intentional criminal actand the police merely make a good
faith error, a balancing of evil in the two party world of criminal law practice
allows us to maintain the conviction. The result of this regrettable approach is no
sanction whatsoever against the police for constitutional breaches due to
incompetence or for failure to affirmatively "police themselves." There is no
incentive to be careful, to practice preventive community relations, to respect the
privacy rights of the citizenry outside of gross negligence or mens rea intrusions.
A remedy that is not based on the exclusionary rule could apply sanctions
appropriate to the police wrong, such as lesser penalties for constitutional breaches
from error, harsher penalties for violations that emanate from gross negligence, and
the harshest penalties for intentional offenses.
VI. OTHER COLLATERAL COSTS: POLICE INTEGRITY
As outlined in a recent law enforcement survey discussed below,67 there is
evidence of substantially false police testimony designed to fit police seizure of
evidence or interrogation of suspects within constitutional parameters to avoid the
application of the exclusionary rule.68 Such a pattern of altering testimony
undermines any impact from the exclusionary rule. To the extent the exclusionary
rule applies, it serves to further stimulate false testimony. From the perspective of
65. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981,990-91 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule
does not apply in situations where the police officer reasonably relied on a faulty warrant issued by a
judge); Leon, 468 U.S. at 923-25 (declaring that the good faith rule is a "modification" of the
exclusionary rule, not an "exception"); see also Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, On Rollercoasters,
Submarines, and Judicial Shipwrecks: Acoustic Separation and the Good Faith Exception to the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 941,962-1015 (discussing the good faith
exception).
66. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 736-37.
67. See infra Part VII.
68. See infra Part VII.
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the police, imposing the exclusionary rule works a direct injustice beyond the scope
of the officer's personal interest. The shading of events during testimony in order
to prevent the release of an arrestee is, to some extent, the product of contempt for
the remedy itself. The admission of evidence is viewed as a game to be played by
the courts, who may not understand the reality of law enforcement and the horrors
that criminals perpetrate on the innocent. To the extent such testimony is adduced,
the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule is moot and the officer opens the door
to perjury, a door behind which further lines may be difficult to draw.
VII. THE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR STUDIES
Notwithstanding its importance, the exclusionary rule has been the subject of
little empirical research. The empirical research that has occurred is one to two
decades old. This collection of research provides only a minor illumination of the
exclusionary rule's impact.'
A. Pre-1992 Studies
According to Stuart S. Nagel, there has been a marked decrease in police
"effectiveness" after the adoption of the exclusionary rule.7' In the early 1970s,
Dallin H. Oaks and James E. Spiotto conducted the first comprehensive look at the
impact of the exclusionary rule by following a series of studies in Chicago,
Cincinnati, and Washington, D.C.7 Oaks determined that the exclusionary rule
most impeded narcotics, weapons, and gambling prosecutions.' It was Oak's
opinion that the exclusionary rule did not deter police illegality in searches and
seizures. 3 He therefore suggested that the rule be abolished on the condition that
a more effective mechanism be developed to allow adequate court review of cases
69. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 678.
70. See Stuart S. Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 WIS. L.
REV. 283, 288. Nagel's study consisted of a 1963 survey of randomly selected police chiefs,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and civil rights advocates. See id. at 283-84. Mr. Nagel sent
out 250 questionnaires and received 113 responses (45%) from 47 states. See id. The goal of the study
was to measure the differences in police training and practices in states which had an exclusionary rule
before the 1961 Mapp decision and those which did not. See id.
71. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the ExclusionaryRuleand Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1970); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and
Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); see also Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spioto Research and United States v.
Calandra, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 740 (1974) (analyzing the studies conducted by Oaks and Spiotto).
72. See Oaks, supra note 71, at 683-89.
73. See id. at 675.
involving the Fourth Amendment.74
Spiotto compared Oaks's results to the record in Chicago in 1971 and found
that approximately thirty percent of the narcotics, weapons, and gambling cases
were dismissed due to search and seizure problems soon after charges were filed
in court."' Spiotto found that seventy-eight percent of defendants bringing motions
to suppress had a prior record and, ironically, that those defendants had a
significantly greater chance of having a motion to suppress sustained than those
without criminal records.76 Thus, Spiotto concluded that "the exclusionary rule
permits many defendants with criminal records to escape punishment for offenses
actually committed but few who have no previous contact with the criminal justice
system. 77
Bradley C. Canon conducted a number of surveys concerning the exclusionary
rule, the most important being a 1973 survey of police, prosecutors, and public
defenders in major cities.78 Canon found that between 1967 and 1973 there was an
increase in the use of search warrants and similar procedures restricting the police
in searches.79 Canon concluded that the exclusionary rule had some deterrent
impact on police misconduct in search and seizure."
In 1978, in response to a congressional request, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) surveyed all criminal cases processed by thirty-eight U.S. Attorney's
offices." The GAO took two data samples.82 The first consisted of cases that were
formerly presented for prosecution during a two month period in 1978, and the
second sample consisted of cases closed during the same period.83 Of about 2800
closed cases, 29.8% involved search and seizure issues, but only 10.5% of the
defendants filed Fourth Amendment suppression motions.84 Of those cases going
through trial, however, 32.6% involved search and seizure motions to suppress.85
For those cases where motions were granted, the likelihood of acquittal or
dismissal was tripled from fifteen percent to forty-five to fifty percent.86 In sum,
although one in eight felony defendants who go to trial have their cases dismissed
by the court or are acquitted by a jury, statistics showed that where search and
74. See id. at 755.
75. See Spiotto, supra note 71, at 255.
76. See id. at 255-56.
77. Id. at 257.
78. See Bradley C. Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter
Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398, 401 (1979).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OFTHE U.S., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GGD. 79-45,
IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, (1979) (hereinafter
COMPTROLLER'S REPORT].
82. See id.
83. See id. at app. H at 6.
84. See id. at app. II at 8-9.
85. See id. at app. H at 10.
86. See id. at app. H at 13.
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seizure motions exclude evidence the rate of dismissal or acquittal was close to
fifty percent.87
As discussed above, beyond the problem of dismissal or acquittal at trial is the
rejection by prosecutors of a case at the outset if there are search and seizure issues
that may result in critical evidence being excluded." The GAO study suggested
that U.S. Attorneys rejected very few cases on the basis of search and seizure
issues,.finding only 1.3% rejected for that stated primary reason.89 But the GAO
study is misleading, and this distortion has been seized upon by proponents of the
exclusionary rule who claim that for purposes of rejecting a case at the outset, the
exclusionary rule has little impact.' First, compliance with search and seizure
standards is more likely with the FBI and other federal law enforcement officials
than may be the case with the local police departments functioning under state law.
Substantial resources are spent in training federal law enforcement officials.
Second, the scope of allowable search at the federal level is often much broader
given the range of federal crimes prosecuted. For example, wide latitude is given
for border and immigration searches. Finally, prosecutors are given many options
on which to base a case rejection. Prosecutors, who work closely with law
enforcement, are understandably hesitant to reject a case with a written record that
a police officer is responsible. Where the exclusionary rule will fatally apply, the
common and more generic "insufficient evidence" rationale or even other entries
allows prosecutors to choose another category as the rejection basis.
In 1982, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)91 completed a study which
warranted revision of the GAO results. This study is important because it focuses
on the far more prevalent state court forum utilized for criminal prosecutions. This
study found that a significant number of felony cases are rejected for prosecution
in California because of search and seizure problems.92 Specifically, the study
illustrated that the total felony arrests reported in California from 1976 to 1979,
close to five percent were rejected due to the likelihood of evidence exclusion. 9
Furthermore, the study found the percentage to be even higher in the larger cities.94
For example, in two Los Angeles County offices in 1981, the rates of rejection
based on search and seizure problems were 11.7% and 14.6%. 9'
87. See id.
88. See supra Part II.C.
89. See COMPTROLLER'S REPORT, supra note 81, at app. II at 11.
90. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
1.2, at n.6. (3d ed. 1996).
91. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 1.
92. See id. at 10.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 11.
The NIJ study revealed some additional facts. The study reported that 45.8%
of the 2141 defendants who escaped prosecution for felonies in California in 1976
and 1977 because of the exclusionary rule were rearrested within two years of their
release. 96 These 981 released individuals accounted for 2713 rearrests, and 1270
for felony offenses. 7 The defendants who were rearrested had an average of three
rearrests each during the follow-up period.98 The study notes that analysis of the
nature of the felony rearrests statewide reveals that, although many of the rearrests
were for drug crimes, the majority were for personal or for property crimes or for
other felony offenses.' The message is clear: approximately 1000 felons each
year are let go, and most of them commit additional felony offenses, including such
crimes as murder, robbery, and burglary, within the two year period after their
release. '0 The NU report illustrates that "this study found a major impact of the
exclusionary rule on state prosecutions."'0 '
The California statistics likely understate the impact of the exclusionary rule
in the charging of criminal cases. Prosecutors are hesitant to cite search and
seizure as a major reason for rejecting a case at the outset. They generally prefer
to cite "lack of prosecution" or "insufficient evidence"'0 2 in order to not directly
insult officers with whom they must work on a daily basis. While working with the
San Diego Office of the District Attorney in 1982, 1 conducted an informal survey
of complaint issuance in San Diego, in which I surveyed 150 rejected potential
felony cases. The survey found that fifty-one of the issuances involved clear
exclusionary rule problems.
Thomas Y. Davies has critiqued the NIJ study based primarily on the possible
bias of the Los Angeles Office of the District Attorney as a source of the 1982
rejection data. 3 Davies also criticized the study based on the ambiguity as to what
indicators were used to designate an exclusionary rule based rejection. o Davies
further criticized the two Los Angeles offices as atypical.0 5 Davies noted that the
offices reported between 11.8% and 14.6% of rejected arrests resulting from
prospective application of the exclusionary rule.'o 6 Davies determined that these
96. See id. at 13.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 15-16.
99. See id. at 16.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 2.
102. See id. at 9.
103. See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 611,617-19; Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 706-07.
104. See Davies, supra note 103, at 617-19.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 632.
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statistics were more than double the statewide percentage of 4.8%.'07 However, the
Davies critique is flawed in important respects."
Davies's final calculation of total system cost illustrates that in 2.35% of all
cases, including police releases, rejections, and all court dismissals, the release or
nonprosecution of an arrestee was based on an exclusionary rule application.', 9
The small percentage of post filing dismissals, approximately one percent,
attributed to the exclusionary rule is likely accurate." However, the 1.4%
calculation for all police releases and prosecution rejections substantially
understates impact at this early stage."' We would place the total percentage in the
four percent to six percent range.
However, applying the conservative numbers of Davies to recent male arrest
data yields the dismissal of 40,087 felony arrestees annually, including 12,381
arrests for violent crimes. 2 The number of crime victims, which includes deaths,
injuries, and monetary losses, disproportionately impacts the impoverished and
lower middle class and is difficult to fix with precision; however, it is momentous
by any standard of measurement. Under the conservative assumptions of Davies,
and given known high rates of recidivism for those who are convicted and serve
time, the exclusionary rule release of arrestees is annually responsible for a
substantial number of homicides, robberies, forcible rapes, and arsons."
3
These consequences arguably exclude the more extensive effect-the issued
cases where less severe or later developing exclusionary rule implications lead to
plea bargains to lesser charges and dropping of counts, special allegations, or
107. See id. Few prosecutors serving the function of "issue deputy," who decides whether to file or
reject a case, would dispute the 12% to 15% share of rejected cases involving prospective exclusionary
rule application as a floor. See id. However, a more realistic estimate is that approximately one-third
of rejected cases involve the exclusionary rule.
108. There is no evidence that the Los Angeles offices distorted the data or are unrepresentative.
Rather, they are large offices and reasonably representative of the state as a whole in terms of police
relations and types of offenses. In contrast, the lower percentage data relied on by Davies to criticize
the Los Angeles figures are themselves suspect. As discussed above, due to the fault directed at police
with whom prosecutors work, which is implicit in exclusionary rule based rejections, prosecutors
understandably use the more general categories of rejection in the lower percentage data.
109. See Davies, supra note 103, at 654-56.
110. See id.at655.
11. Seeid.
112. See U.S. DEPT'TOFJUSTICE, FEDERALBUREAU OFINVESrlGATION STATISTICS: MALE ARRESTS,
DISTRIBUTION BY AGE, 1995, at tbl. 39 (1996). The 2.35% proportion of arrestees posited by Davies
is multiplied by the 1995 male arrests of 1,705,681 for property and violent crimes, with 526,833 of this
total ascribed to the violent crimes of homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. See id.
113. See Davies, supra note 103, at 631-44.
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priors.'14
Within the past decade, one of two widely reported studies includes the 1991
limited survey by Craig D. Uchida and Timothy S. Bynum, which is an examina-
tion of a sample of search warrants from seven sites in 1984 and 1985.115
Unsurprisingly, they found that few were successfully traversed.' 6  The study
found that eighty-six percent of all warrants were executed and that these warrants
led to arrests sixty-six percent of the time." 7 Only thirteen percent of primary
warrants (searches directed at defendants) were contested, and motions to suppress
evidence seized were granted in 0.9% of the cases." 8 Uchida and Bynum failed to
report the cases which may have suffered prosecutorial rejection based on
anticipated traversal or other exclusionary rule problems from the thirty-four
percent of the warrants that did not result in arrest." 9 Search warrants are only
involved in a small percentage of criminal arrests. Most searches subject to
suppression dispute are those incident to an arrest.
B. 1998 Pepperdine Study
Most recently, the L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell, Carol A. Chase,
and Ronald W. Fagan Study (Pepperdine Study) received responses concerning law
enforcement perceptions and competence pertinent to the exclusionary rule from
296 sheriff deputies and 115 police officers in Ventura County, California, and 55
police officers from throughout California attending a search and seizure
continuing education seminar. 20 The survey counted 19.7% of respondents
measuring the exclusion of evidence as a "primary concern" in their work, and
59.3% placing it as an "important concern." 2' The numbers declined to 15.4% and
53.3% respectively when focusing on their interrogation of suspects involving Fifth
Amendment issues. 121 Just over fifty percent of the five search and seizure
hypothetical questions, which were designed to test knowledge were answered
114. See id. at 668-70 (discussing other aspects of the "costs" of the exclusionary rule, including
whether the exclusionary rule affects plea bargains).
115. See Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and "Loss
Cases:" The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1034, 1035 (1991).
116. See id. at 1064-65. The process for challenging a search warrant is often called a "traversal
motion." The movant carries a difficult burden in challenging an issued warrant. Usually, the movant
must establish the falsity of facts relied upon within the affidavit supporting the warrant. Further, if the
affidavit establishes sufficient probable cause with such erroneous facts struck, it will withstand
challenge. Finally, in most jurisdictions the traversal motion is held before the same court which issued
the underlying warrant. Hence, a movant must demonstrate that the magistrate or the court issuing the
warrant was misled or erred.
117. See id. at 1052 tbl. 2.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 713.
121. See id. at 721 tbl. 1.
122. See id. at 721 tbl. 2.
946
[Vol. 26: 923, 1999] Optimum Remedy for Constitutional Breaches
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
correctly, and approximately seventy-four percent of the five interrogation
questions were answered correctly. 2 3 The data suggested that fifty-five percent of
officers had suffered exclusion of evidence gathered during their respective
investigations at least once, and of those more than two-thirds were informed of the
exclusion by the prosecutor or heard it in court.'24 In the Pepperdine Study,
officers were asked five hypothetical questions to test their knowledge of current
search and seizure law. 25 Interestingly, the study found no statistically significant
differences in results among those who had suffered exclusion.'26 The evidence
indicates that even after evidence is excluded against an officer, there is little
motivation to improve knowledge for better compliance. The survey also found
some officers giving false testimony to fit evidence seizure within constitutional
parameters.
27
The survey also explored police officer views of options to the exclusionary
rule, including criminal prosecution, monetary fines of officers, police employment
termination or discipline short of termination, monetary damages after suit or
hearing, and required education. 2 1 Only the lenient required education secured
substantial support, with 36.5% favoring it, while 57% favored continued reliance
on the exclusionary rule. 29
C. Summary
Based on a review of the concededly paltry prior studies and surveys extant,
what is the evidence of benefit from the exclusionary rule? In looking at the NU
figures, one is struck by the relative steadiness of cases rejected for search and
seizure reasons from 1976 to 1979.130 In 1976, 1057 cases were rejected, and in
1979, 1014 were rejected. 3' The total number of felony cases rejected increased
very little. 3 2 There is no evidence that the numbers have declined since. Although
Canon concluded that the initial use of the exclusionary rule increased search
123. See id. at 728 tbl. 6.
124. See id. at 722-23.
125. See id. at 713-14.
126. See id. at 724 (stating that "officers without prior exclusions had a mean score of 2.86" on the
search and seizure questions, and "those with prior exclusions had a mean score of 2.94").
127. See id. at 725-27.
128. See id. at 732, 733 tbl. 7.
129. See id. The survey did not include the remedy proposed herein, which is court imposed civil
penalties on the police agency or the department employing the officers.
130. See NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 10.
131. Seeid.
132. See id.
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warrants and changed police practices,' 33 it is easy to overestimate its impact. In
fact, if the exclusionary rule worked to deter police behavior, we would not see a
relatively steady percentage of cases rejected on these grounds, norlwould we see
search and seizure issues raised and decisions confirming such problems within the
appellate courts. If the exclusionary rule was effective would there not be an
empirical effect on police behavior, complaints about police, numbers and
percentages of prosecution rejections, or of motions or writs granted? Where is the
record of progressive pressure on police behavior to limit constitutional breaches
to trivial or at least lower levels?
The Pepperdine study concluded that the exclusionary rule remedy lacked
effective deterrent impact, noting as follows:
The rule's failure as a specific deterrent is demonstrated in two ways: (1) the
apparent absence of any formal procedure ... notifying officers when they have had
evidence subsequently excluded by the court;' 34 and (2) the failure of the officers
who had previously had evidence excluded to outperform other officers on the
hypothetical questions. The exclusion of evidence, if it is to provide any specific
deterrence, must be a learning experience for the officer....
Similarly, the rule lacks any significant general deterrent effect, as is recognized
by the officers themselves.' 3'
Lacking evidence of progressive efficacy, a substitute remedy is needed,
particularly one able to avoid the considerable collateral costs of the exclusionary
rule.
VIII. THE ELEMENTS OF AN OPTIMUM REMEDY
Any substitute remedy to the exclusionary rule should be analyzed rationally
against the existing rule and other options. Seven elements warrant inclusion in
such a comparative examination. Each element is commended by either standard
efficacy measurement or by the jurisprudential reality of judicial responsibility to
actualize a check over executive branch constitutional abuse.
A. Judicial Control
Any substitute remedy must remain substantially under judicial branch control
for several reasons. First, there is a commonly expressed concern about judicial
contamination or complicity where the court admits evidence gathered in violation
133. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
134. Note the implications of this finding vis-a-vis the remedy proposed herein: the lack of concern
of police agencies over constitutional compliance by their officers. See infra Part XLB.4. The remedy
presented below provides a clear incentive to substantially revise that failure by directing sanctions at
the agency. See infra Part XI.B.4.
135. Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 734-35 (footnotes omitted).
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of constitutional standards. Accordingly, such contamination is mitigated where
the court is empowered to coextensively implement a substitute remedy. Where
that remedy is more effective and direct than the exclusionary rule, the court will
be replacing one remedy with a more effective option. At the same time, the court
avoids a different kind of contamination that is arguably as debilitating to court
legitimacy as are constitutional breaches-the possible compromise of an accurate
finding of fact through denial of reliable and probative evidence to the trier of fact,
with a possible erroneous outcome resulting.
Second, because the power to protect against constitutional violations lies with
the judiciary, it must be given control over a remedy's implementation. As a
practical matter, an institution is best able to give up important authority where it
controls the new substitute in its stead.
B. Remedy Retention
Criminal courts should be able to trigger a remedy for constitutional breaches
which occur within the course of their own proceedings. As noted above,
supporters of the exclusionary rule argue that the rule is required to prevent a court
from becoming a party to a constitutional violation. 36 Such a problem is
ameliorated where the court itself can trigger and adjudicate a remedy based on
facts arising from a case before it.
Retaining control over the remedy in at least the same group of cases currently
subject to exclusionary rule sanction is important for the independent reason that
it is a natural detector of such abuses. As argued above, it is not the entire universe
of such abuses, but it is a sample where evidence is efficiently available concerning
police methodology. 3 7 As a practical matter, it would not serve constitutional
compliance to exclude a major source of detection from some deterrent producing
remedy.
C. Adequate Coverage or Reach
While an optimum remedy will allow imposition where violations are detected
in criminal matters, as is currently the case, it should also include a broader reach
of cases in which incriminating evidence is not discovered. Although it may be
impractical and counterproductive to adjudicate every police encounter with
citizens or even every citizen objection to a police action, coverage should extend
beyond the current limited group of cases where (1) there is a discovery of
136. See supra Part VII.A.
137. See supra Part VII.A.
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incriminating evidence, (2) the evidence is important to the prosecution of the case,
(3) charges are filed, (4) the evidence's admissibility is litigated, and (5) evidence
is excluded which affects the resulting judgment.
D. Accessibility
A scope beyond the criminal cases when seized evidence is introduced requires
access to the remedy by persons other than criminal defendants. Such access can
be too liberally granted. Ideally, it is balanced to provide incentive and opportunity
for a sufficient number of cases to produce a deterrent impact on constitutional
violations without generating meritless or marginal cases.
E. Nexus to the Constitutional Breach
The sanction authorized by the remedy must match the nature of the
constitutional breach. Violations that are serious should generate a harsher
sanction than those which are less intrusive. In addition to the degree of violation,
the extent of the violation (numbers of persons or events covered), the intent
element involved in its commission (good faith error, gross negligence, or
intentional transgression), and the prior record of the person or entity sanctioned
should all be considered in determining the degree of sanction to be imposed. A
just system produces a graduated response based on the above listed factors.
F. Effective Deterrence
The remedy must be directed at persons or entities able to effect violative
behavior. Ideally, it is imposed in a manner producing an incentive to comply with
constitutional standards and is enforced by important actors producing that
compliance.
G. Due Process and Fairness
The alternative to the exclusionary rule must provide the traditional opportu-
nity of due process for any person or entity subject to its sanction.
The lodestar of these criteria is the effective influence of police behavior to
comply with constitutional standards. Effective is here defined as deterring
violations as directly and precisely as possible, with the penalty increasing
consistently with that purpose.
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IX. TRADITIONAL OPTIONS
A. Historical Proposals
1. Private Civil Rights and Privacy Damage Actions
Private common law tort, civil rights, and privacy damage actions'38 suffer
from serious flaws. First, the damages due to the victim of a police intrusion may
not be easily quantifiable and may not relate to the societal interest compromised
by constitutional breach. Second, the entire universe of exclusionary rule imposed
cases are excludable based on jury antipathy for the award of damages to a
criminal. Finally, there are practical impediments to remedy implementation,
because access to the courts for civil redress is expensive. Only where a class
action format allows the accumulation of damages, or where attorney's fees are
allowed under a private attorney general doctrine, is access likely. Counsel is
generally unavailable to pursue cases where personal damages are less than
$50,000. An improper search and seizure is unlikely to produce easily documented
damages on a scale likely to attract a contingency fee attorney. Payment of hourly
based fees is unrealistic for any such case unless damages are substantial and close
to certain.
The civil remedy option now extant, or as often proposed for strengthening,
fails on most of the above criteria. The civil remedy lacks judicial control. The
judiciary is unable to initiate a civil damage action, even when it receives evidence
in a criminal or civil case indicating that such an action will lie. The court lacks
jurisdiction. Furthermore, in a damage action critical issues are left to jury
decision. Substantial damages are likely to correspond to successful searches
finding incriminating evidence. Hence, the remedy depends on a jury award of
compensation to criminals. In addition, the sanction neither fares well in terms of
accessibility, nor does the remedy necessarily relate to the "constitutional offense"
that is the heart of the prohibition. That is, private damages do not necessarily
match the privacy interests offended by police excess, and they are usually limited
to relatively trivial amounts.'39 Moreover, the positing of a minimum liquidated
138. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Perrin el al., supra note 3, at 739-40.
139. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774,790 (3d Cir. 1939), modified, 307 U.S.
496 (1939); see also Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. REV. 493, 500 (1955) (discussing why plaintiffs do not receive substantial awards when damaged
damage amount would not overcome the fatal disadvantage due to both of lack of
accessibility of an overall nexus between the societal interest at stake and the
measure of the sanction applied.
2. Criminal Prosecution
Criminal prosecution is realistic only in extreme cases in which there are
constitutional abuses that invoke criminal law jurisdiction, for example police
shootings or beatings. As the notorious Rodney King case indicated, securing
convictions of police officers, even in allegedly extreme circumstances and with
apparently compelling evidence, is problematic. Beyond the narrow scope of
constitutional violations covered by this mechanism is the reality of an ongoing
working relationship between police agencies and the public prosecutor upon
whom such prosecutions rely. While many offices of the district attorney
undertake such cases in good faith, constitutional reliance on such a remedy is
problematic.
3. Employee Sanction
Direct sanctions directed at individual officers who violate constitutional
standards have important advantages-they focus on the persons involved, may have
strong deterrent impact, and can remove renegade or recidivist police offenders
from law enforcement. However, substantial reliance on such a remedy has
numerous practical difficulties. First, it is not within the control of the judiciary. 4
Second, it interplays with labor relations law and labor management contract
agreements. Third, it may gravitate toward the creation of scapegoats where police
practices are agency wide. Fourth, it is unclear what kind of entity could decide
such cases independent from entanglement with the officers involved. Finally, it
is not settled who would initiate such cases to give it sufficient accessibility so that
the odds of a consequence from a constitutional breach are high enough to have
deterrent impact.
X. A CRITIQUE OF THE PEPPERDINE STUDY
The brief critique above of the exclusionary rule, and of the inadequacy of
existing civil remedies, is largely shared by the authors of the Pepperdine Study.' 4'
The authors instead propose a creative and interesting administrative remedy to
substitute for the exclusionary rule. 42 But there are serious theoretical and
by illegal police activity).
140. See supra Part VIII (listing the characteristics of an optimum remedy).
141. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 750-53 (discussing how the administrative scheme would deter
police conduct).
142. See id. at 743-44.
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practical problems with their proposal, or with the use of administrative remedies,
as the vehicle for police constitutional compliance in general. Unfortunately, they
regrettably confine their remedy to good faith searches'43 and allow the
exclusionary rule to continue where searches are conducted in "knowing and
intentional" violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.'"
A. The Maintenance of Evidence Exclusion for Intentional Violations
The Pepperdine Study appears to fill a developing gap in current remedies.
While the exclusionary rule would continue to serve as a remedy for violations not
subject to the good faith exception, 45 the latter cases, instead of escaping sanction,
would be subject to a substitute administrative remedy. '6 The distinction drawn
is justified by reference to the "contamination" argument allegedly compelling
continued court refusal to admit evidence obtained through a breach of constitu-
tional standards beyond "innocent error." '47
The proponents of the administrative option properly characterize it as more
effective in deterring police violations that are intentional or negligent than the
exclusionary rule. However, the authors then fail to apply their own reasoned
finding by leaving the ineffective exclusionary rule as a supplemental remedy to be
applied in every case where there is an intentional violation of a constitutional
standard. The rationale is a concern over compromising "judicial integrity" in
admitting wrongfully obtained evidence.'4 This flawed analysis ignores the
compelling case for an overall substitute for the exclusionary rule. The "court
integrity" concern also ignores the considerable collateral costs of the exclusionary
rule, including the betrayal of adjudicative truth-seeking purpose. This latter
consequence is itself a source of serious judicial integrity compromise.
Carving out separate remedies based on the police actor's degree of innocence
further increases the distractive examination of issues ancillary to a criminal case's
proper focus, which is the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It requires another
factual determination subject to contest, writ review, or appeal: Was this case of
police investigative practice properly decided through the exclusionary rule, or was
it innocent error and properly invoking only the proposed administrative remedy?
143. See id. at 740. The good faith exception would also cover warrantless searches if the officer had
a good objective belief that exigent circumstances existed. See id.
144. See id. at 753.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 741-54.
147. See id. at 753-54.
148. See id.
And if the offense is intentional, it means we now have two separate proceedings
examining police behavior and applying separate sets of sanctions.
B. Lack of Direct Court Control
As argued above, a substitute to the exclusionary rule must secure from the
court the surrender of the exclusionary rule in lieu. The administrative remedy is
inherently incapable of achieving such a result because it is not within the control
of the judiciary. Indeed, this may be one reason why the remedy is confined to the
good faith cases likely to be rejected by the court for exclusionary rule application.
However, if one wishes to go beyond that circumscribed supplement and instead
implement a legitimate substitute, the judiciary must control the remedy. The
administrative remedy vests the initial decision making and decisions to initiate
cases with the executive branch, the very branch accused of wrongdoing. Although
one executive agency can be arranged to check another, as intended by the
Pepperdine Study, 49 that check is not one the judiciary should properly rely upon
because it may be corrupted by legislative or executive decisions outside of its
purview.
C. Administrative Structure Problems
The Pepperdine Study creates a new structure modeled after the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, 50 creating a typical administrative decision making
model pursuant to the existing Administrative Procedure Act (APA)."5 ' The
Department of Fair Employment and Housing "serves an enforcement function,
investigating claims of discrimination and prosecuting [their violation administra-
tively]."' 52  A commission oversees the agency and serves the final agency
adjudicative function.153
The process would work in a manner similar to the discipline systems of the
thirty-nine agencies within the Department of Consumer Affairs.'54 The process
depends substantially upon the submission of claims to an agency administrative
element, a "department.""' The department investigates cases and decides whether
to pursue such private claims. 56 Where the agency's department decides to pursue
149. See id. at 744-53.
150. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); Perrin et al., supra note
3, at 744 (citations omitted).
151. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 11500-11529; Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 745 (citations omitted).
152. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 744 (citing § 12930 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997)).
153. See id. (citing § 12935).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 744-45 (citing § 12960).
156. See id. at 745 (citing §§ 12963, 12965).
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the matter, it brings an action before an administrative law judge (Au).", As is
customary, the AU writes a proposed decision to the commission overseeing the
agency, which makes a final administrative adjudicatory decision. 5 '
Because a judicial body has not reviewed the decision either constitutionally
or pursuant to the APA, review is normally available by petition for writ of
administrative mandate in superior court.'59 Appeal may then be taken to the court
of appeal, with petition to the supreme court."6
The problems with this structure are apparent from its description. Far from
being streamlined or efficient, it relies upon the most inefficient and irrational
mechanism humanly possible for the resolution of human disputes: the APA system
of adjudicative enforcement. 6 ' First, the system appoints as the critical and final
administrative adjudicator a "Commission," which oversees the operations of the
agency deciding whether or not to prosecute.'62 To recapitulate, the agency
conducts an investigation which will not necessarily involve any of the elements
associated with due process. Based on a unilateral investigation, it will decide to
prosecute on behalf of a claimant.'63 An AJ, presumably from the independent
Office of Administrative Hearings, will hear the matter. 6' But the decision of the
ALJ is merely "proposed" and will be transmitted as such to the Commission,
which will make the final decision. 65 Hence, the Commission, which sets policy
and hires agency personnel, decides a case prosecuted by its own agents. This is
due process?
157. See § 11512 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 745-46 (citing §§
12965(a), 12969 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997)).
158. See id. at 746 (citing § 11517(b)).
159. See CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1999); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11523 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (allowing judicial review of administrative decisions by "filing a
petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure"); Perrin
et al., supra note 3, at 746 n.539 (describing the process of judicial review).
160. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5.
161. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 743-50 (stating that "[u]nder our proposal, all individuals
injured by police misconduct would have access to a civil administrative process").
162. See id. at 745 (stating that after an individual files a complaint of police misconduct, "a
preliminary review of the complaint [would determine] whether it alleged facts sufficient to constitute
a violation"(citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12963 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997))).
163. See id. (acknowledging that the investigation by an agency investigator amounts to the lone
method of "determining the prima facie validity of the claim"(citing § 12963)).
164. See id. at 746 (stating that an AUJ would determine the claim based on facts and law (citing §
11517(b))).
165. See id. (stating that the administrative law decision would "be submitted, along with the record,
to the adjudicative ann of the agency for adoption, modification, or rejection"(citing § 11517(b))).
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In order to assuage the obvious flaws in such a process, the APA provides for
extensive judicial review,"6 which raises the second structural problem with
reliance on an administrative option. The first hearing is heard by an AUD,
presumably an independent judge directly observing the witnesses, which is
appropriate for a trier of fact given the role of demeanor and inflection in making
findings of fact and weighing credibility. As commonly occurs in California's
administrative enforcement systems, the matter is then submitted as nothing more
than a proposed decision to the Commission, which is a group of political
appointees that are usually persons without legal training and almost invariably
persons who were not present when the evidence was presented.' 67 Based on
nothing more than a review of a written record and brief oral argument, the
Commission is empowered to make a final decision.' 68
Following these two formal proceedings, judicial review begins at the superior
court level, followed by appellate court review and possible supreme court petition,
as noted above.' 69 Hence, the entire process can involve five separate legal
proceedings. Meanwhile, if there is an underlying criminal case deciding not
monetary damages but the rather serious matter of incarceration, it will be decided
by a three step contested process, four steps if one counts the preliminary hearing
in felony cases. As the timelines discussed above indicate, particularly on the civil
side, the administrative process does not promise increased efficiency, but
inefficiency. 70 That inefficiency may be increased where the opposing counsel,
as here, are institutionally retained and have the resources to pursue all available
remedies. A proceeding of this type takes six to eight years.' 7'
D. Lack of Nexus Between Remedy and Constitutional Wrong
How are cases generated that take advantage of the proposed Pepperdine
Study's administrative option? Attorneys are not promised fees to generate such
cases.'72 Presumably, citizens will individually file claims in hope of securing
some compensatory award.' 73 This arrangement raises the same lack of nexus
166. See § 11523 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (allowing judicial review by writ of mandate within 30
days); see also Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 745 (noting that if a complaint is found to be baseless by
the agency investigator then the complainant still has judicial remedies available (citing § 12965(b)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1997))).
167. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 746 (stating that the AU's decision would be submitted to the
agency "for adoption, modification, or rejection"(citing § 11517(b))).
168. See id. (citing § 11517).
169. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
170. See The Need for a New APA, CAL. REG. L. REP., Summer 1989, at 6, 6 (describing the
inefficient process by which the administrative law process operates in reality rather than in theory).
But see Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 751-52 (discussing the efficiency of the proposed administrative
scheme due to the "streamlined administrative process").
171. See The Needfor a New APA, supra note 170, at 6.
172. See Penin et al., supra note 3, at 745.
173. See id. (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE §12960).
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problems that exist in the civil damage remedy context. While this arrangement
eliminates the jury bias against compensating an individual disproportionately, it
fails to achieve a strong nexus between remedy and wrong. Nor is the direction of
disproportionate damages to a single individual a better option than a remedy
directing penalties customized to the police wrong for a socially beneficent
purpose, such as the crime victim fund or even the state's general fund. Will the
cognizable damages to an individual, who happens to file a claim, match the degree
and nature of public harm accruing from a police incursion? There may be some
relationship between the two concepts, but if this relationship can be measured with
direct accuracy and without the impediment of damage concept baggage, why not
so measure it?174
The option proposed in the Pepperdine Study allows for punitive damages,
with a $10,000 cap for first offenses and increasing up to $50,000 for multiple
violations. 7 The absolute maximum of $50,000 is facially inadequate where a
large department has spawned multiple, extreme, and repeated violations of the
Constitution. Further, the assessment is based on punitive damage concepts, which
in California requires outrageous behavior in extremis for any assessment
whatsoever by current statutory restriction.176 In addition, the damages accruing
would form a disproportionate windfall to the claimant, providing a false incentive
to file claims apart from the merits; moreover, this is not necessary to generate bona
fide reports of violations.'77
Finally, the damages may well not come from the agency in the optimum
position to discourage constitutional breaches (for example, the police department
employing the offenders), but under current practice, would be assessed against the
general fund of the city or the county.' The design of this remedy is overly
focused on compensation rather than deterrence, and in the context of a wrong, not
amenable to redress under compensation principles.
174. See infra Part XI (discussing the proposed option).
175. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 749 (noting that such a cap may "be appropriate, provided it
is sufficiently high to deter the most egregious violations of the Constitution"(citing § 12987(a)(3))).
176. See id. (citing § 12987(a)(3)).
177. The proposal adds an undefined power to enter "cease and desist orders" against persons of
entities responsible for violations. See id. at 749 & n.555 (citing § 12987). There are numerous
problems with the proposal as framed. One cannot issue any order against an entity who was not a party
to the proceedings giving rise to the controversy. Further, it is unclear how the Commission is to obtain
jurisdiction absent claimant applications. Unlike a typical administrative agency, this one would not
have licensing power over those sought to be influenced. That failure creates serious jurisdictional
difficulties in the execution of the proposed remedy as a practical matter. This failure is accentuated
by the alleged power to use "contempt or sanction" authority over those who violate such orders.
178. See id. at 748.
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E. The Administrative Process Is Unsuited to Its Assigned Task
The APA process is essentially designed to expedite a hearing. 79 Discovery
is limited to facilitate evidence review at the initial ALI hearing. 180 The agency
adopts rules and standards, detects violations of those standards, and prosecutes
violations using a panoply of available remedies usually involving license related
sanctions.18"' The authors of the Pepperdine Study correctly cite the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act's somewhat different model.8 2 Like the Pepperdine
Study, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act Model involves an agency
essentially deciding a dispute between two other parties. 83 Its resources are
essentially arranged to allow the weaker party a reasonable chance to have a
complaint examined and applicable law applied."s It is more realistic to create an
agency able to occupy the field of fair housing practices than for one to occupy the
much more complex and involved field of constitutional compliance by the police
across the host of doctrines listed in the discussion above.'85 This is an area of
expertise already possessed and exercised extensively by existing courts. Because
those courts will get any such case that is reviewed judicially, what is the benefit
of superimposing a group with no greater expertise for additional preliminary
proceedings, even if not steeped in the self-serving conflict of judging their own
agency's decision to go forward?
The two major arguments in support of the Pepperdine Study proposal appear
to be the filtering process available through ALJ hearings outside existing crowded
court dockets and the chance to even the playing field by providing claimants with
publicly paid counsel who will filter out weak claims through their own investiga-
tion independent from the claimant's.'86 However, these advantages must be
measured against the difficulties listed above. Moreover, they may be achievable
through proper incentives to bring actions in existing courts in a manner allowing
for the broad substitution of the existing exclusionary rule with a court controlled
remedy adjustable to the police misconduct encountered, including full due
process, and directed at the entity capable of assuring maximum deterrent impact.
179. See id. at 745 (citing CAL. Gov'TCODE §§ 11500-11529).
180. See id. (citing Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 814 P.2d 704,715
(Cal. 1991)).
181. See id. at 744-47 (citations omitted).
182. See id. at 744 (citing §§ 12900-12996).
183. See id. (citations omitted).
184. See id. (citations omitted).
185. See supra Part II.
186. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 745-46, 751-52.
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XI. THE OPTIMUM REMEDY: MULTIACCESSED CIVIL PENALTIES IN
EQUITY
Regardless of the nature or degree of the officer's breach, the defendant's
crime and society's interest in preserving a truth-seeking judicial process remains.
An option exits that ameliorates most of the administrative law deficiencies, lessens
the private damage remedy and the problems with other options, and allows
criminal courts to admit into evidence all reliable evidence without the false
distinction of the state of mind of the officer gathering it. That difference in police
mens rea properly influences the remedy we apply to the police, but does not justify
varying the process in deciding crime and punishment when there are implications
well beyond the purview of police practices.
The optimum remedy capable of meeting these ideal elements is an action in
equity for civil penalties directed at police agents violating constitutional standards.
This option has analogous precedents much more promising than the administrative
remedy proposed,'87 and, importantly, retains a critical direct role for the courts in
constitutional enforcement. The courts understandably will not abandon the
exclusionary rule without a substitute remedy to ensure constitutional compliance,
and such an option is best vested in them."'
Because the court would sit in equity, it would be empowered to enter
injunctions against police practices and to fashion restitution for injured citizens.
The restitution concept would allow appropriate relief to be granted to all persons
injured, not merely those individuals who are party plaintiffs. Further, the civil
penalty focus would allow the court to fashion remedies according to the nature
and extent of the wrong for a measured response thereby creating a deterrent
impact.
Such a court-focused option was in fact drafted and introduced in California
as Senate Bill 728 by Senator Robert Presley (Democrat, Riverside), but the bill
was not enacted. 89 If California Senate Bill 728 was passed, it would create a
statute prohibiting constitutional affronts, but by a means separate and apart from
187. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17209 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (illustrating the
successful use of civil penalties under a similar format in the enforcement of the Unfair Competition
Act, especially sections 17206 and 17207).
188. Apart from the merits of judicial control, any proposal to eliminate the exclusionary rule and
the power associated with it may meet resistence if it cedes jurisdiction to another entity.
189. See S. 728, x Leg. 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993), available in WL Comm. Rep. CA S.B.
728. The measure was drafted by the instant author and sponsored by the Center for Public Interest
Law. Senator Presley, a former sheriff, is a political Democrat with strong traditional liberal support
and is equally concerned about civil liberties and effective law enforcement.
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the exclusion of otherwise reliable and probative evidence from criminal
proceedings."9 This bill would grant to the court equitable powers, including
awarding civil penalties, to recompense and deter constitutional offenses by
penalizing the agency controlling the police, rather than crime victims and the
people of California through the exclusion of evidence.' 9 ' It would establish a
system allowing access to the court by outside counsel or through court initiation."9
A. Official Description of California Senate Bill 728
The expressed purpose of the exclusionary rule provision is to "permit reliable
evidence to be admitted in court while providing a penalty for those who
improperly seize the evidence."' 9' Accordingly, "Califomia Senate Bill 728 would
create a statute that makes sense in that it prohibits illegally or improperly obtained
evidence but it does not necessarily exclude such evidence where it is reliable."' 94
The proposed bill provided the following:
1. Expressed purpose of the exclusionary rule provision ....
This bill would create a civil penalty system to punish and deter constitutional
offenses, penalizing the department or agency controlling the police, rather than the
people of California by completely excluding evidence and allowing a criminal to
walk. And the penalty is enforced by the court, as is the exclusionary rule; it is
enacted as a more effective on point remedy, without collateral costs.
2. All unlawfully obtained evidence would be admissible if relevant and non-
privileged
This bill would provide that a court would be required to admit all relevant
non-privileged evidence, and could not exclude otherwise admissible evidence from
criminal proceeding because of the violation of constitutional standards in its
acquisition.
Thus, evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment or evidence obtained through a forced or coerced confession
in violation of the Fourth Amendment would be admissible in criminal proceedings
under California law.
3. Civil penalty procedure proposed by the bill
(a) Civil action by private citizen
This bill would permit any person to file a civil suit in superior court against
any state or local public agency whose employees or agents have violated the
constitutional rights of any citizen during the course of a criminal investigation.
The action would be in equity. Thus, there would be no right to a jury trial.
No damages would be awarded to the petitioner.
However, the bill would provide that where the court found that a violation of
190. See id.
191. Seeid.
192. See id.
193. Seeid.
194. Id.
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constitutional rights to had occurred, it could do either or both of the following:
(1) Issue an injunction commanding no further violations.
(2)Impose immediate civil penalties payable by the agency employing or
directing the offender of up to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per
violation.
This bill would provide that where the violation occurred also in violation an
effective injunction against that agency, a civil penalty of up to two hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000) per violation could be imposed against the agency
employing or direction the offender.
The amount of any civil penalty imposed by the court would depend upon the
court's consideration of all of the (1) the flagrancy of the violation of constitutional
rights, (2) the degree of intrusion of the state, (3) the lack of justification for the
intrusion, (4) physical harm to persons or property damage occurring as a result of
the unconstitutional intrusion, (5) the opportunity for a warrant or other permissive
process knowingly and inexcusably avoided by the offender, and (6) the prior record
of such intrusions by the agency employing or directing the offender.
Any civil penalty would be paid to the Crime Victim's fund administered by
the California Board of Control. A civil penalty could only be imposed upon the
law enforcement agency, not the individual officer who violated the person's
constitutional rights. No civil penalties would be paid to the individual who was the
subject of the seizure.
The bill also provides that a successful petitioner would be awarded attorney
fees and costs.
(b) Court initiated civil penalty procedure
The bill would permit a court to initiate a civil penalty proceeding on its own
motion upon a finding of probable cause that a law enforcement agency violated the
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. Upon a finding that a violation had
occurred, the court would be entitled to impose the same civil penalties as in the
civil action described above.
(c) Special prosecutor
The bill would permit the court to appoint a special prosecutor to litigate court-
initiated civil penalty proceedings. The special prosecutor would be vested with all
powers of the Attorney General.
The compensation for the special prosecutor would be paid by the law
enforcement agency accused of committing the violation.1"
195. Id.
B. How California Senate Bill 728 Would Work
1. Judicial Control: Option Applied to Exclusionary Rule Cases
The proposed remedy would allow a criminal trial court to act sua sponte to
initiate a proceeding if the evidence in a case indicates a police violation of the
Constitution. Thus, the "court complicity" concept is fully addressed, and the court
deciding whether to admit evidence has the authority to act decisively on the
collateral issue of penalizing the police for their violations of law. There is
precedent for court appointed special counsel for that purpose.
2. Sanction Nexus to Degree of Police Constitutional Violation
The remedy of civil penalties has numerous advantages over other sanctions.
The remedy does not accrue disproportionately or arbitrarily to an individual. It is
not tied to damages; rather, the remedy of civil penalties is related to the public
offense intended to be deterred. It varies based on the factors listed above,
representing society's interest in deterring such police practices. The greater the
offense and need for deterrence, the greater the penalty. The court decides the
amount sitting in equity, and this amount will be subject to judicial review to
ensure some consistency between jurisdictions, but will not rely on the jury or
notions of private damage and possible private enrichment. At the same time,
injunctions may be entered and restitution may be ordered to recompense all of
those injured through police practices, not merely those who file actions based on
restitutionary principles rather than the more problematic concept of damages. In
both cases, a court decides the final remedy without a jury.
3. Sanction Scope Beyond Exclusionary Rule Cases
In addition, other cases may be brought to collect penalties by private counsel
outside and beyond the scope of the current confined scope of exclusionary rule
application. The amounts obtained do not accrue to the local jurisdiction sued and
cannot be "shell game" replaced; rather, they must be taken from the agency's own
account. The amount accrues to a separate crime victim fund that currently exists.
However, the likelihood of such additional suits is realistically predictable. A
meritorious case will yield attorney's fees for plaintiff's counsel. Further, under
the "private attorney general doctrine" in California, a multiplier above market
levels is possible." Such a balancing is likely to yield additional enforcement with
a minimum of spurious filings. Aggrieved citizens will be able to initiate cases that
196. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1999); see also Serrano v. Priest, 569
P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977) (stating that a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party).
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do not focus on the plaintiff's character, but instead on police actions. The plaintiff
will not receive a monetary award, but the plaintiff will have a contingency attorney
at no cost to vindicate a public wrong. The contingency attorney has a natural
incentive to pursue only meritorious cases because unmeritorious cases result in
time and expense, not compensation.
4. Targeting the Police Agency for Deterrent Impact
Under the civil damage or administrative options, funds tend to come from the
general fund of the city or the county of the police agency involved. However,
under the proposed remedy, funds come from the entity that is most likely to
sanction the individual officers, the police agency, which is effectively responsible
for police practices. The funds may not be replenished, and such a sanction is
taken far more seriously than a county general fund assessment from a civil rights
judgment. It comes from the sacrosanct budget of the department-the source of
new equipment, raises for employees, expansion, new vehicles, and larger offices.
Under existing law, police aggression that is severe, injurious, or lethal is
properly targeted with criminal sanctions and employment firings. Such extreme
departure from acceptable police practices is likely to encounter a check from
another agency (for example, the FBI) or even a prosecutor (for example, district
attorney, state attorney general, or U.S. attorney). Furthermore, such a departure
from acceptable police department practices may trigger an employment action
firing.
Missing from these remedies for extreme departures is the more common need
to counter the large scale, gradual movement of police behavior toward constitu-
tional breach. Such a movement gradually slides from respect for the Constitution
to the macho strutting "make my day" mode of policing; thus, the line between
"negligent" but good faith intrusion and "knowing violation" of constitutional
rights becomes blurred. Certainly the delineation of one from the other presents
a difficult burden of proof, as the prosecutor of any specific intent crime will attest.
The gradual transformation of a police department from its common "to serve
and protect" motto to something more uncomfortable is easy to understand for
those who have been a part of law enforcement. Police officers deal with victims
and criminals. Day after day officers see the pain and suffering of law violators.
Officers apprehend people who are not only hostile, but also violent and dangerous.
It is easy to slide into viewing certain people as "pukes," a term commonly used for
suspects. It is not necessarily the product of racism or even of discrimination. It
may, and often does, emanate from understandable and laudable empathy for the
victims. The officer is on their side. The officers may be increasingly angry and
contemptuous for those they view as the tormentors of the weak and vulnerable.
Such officers are not internalizing our worst instincts, but perhaps our best. The
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problem becomes the reflection of the contempt that can surface on a class of
persons with some indicia associated with the reviled group. Not only may the
indicia be inaccurate, but the mode of investigation can change very gradually so
that at some point it passes a line. The trick is to draw the line, but not so finely
that the job cannot be accomplished because the officers are, by and large,
protecting the weak and defenseless from predators; instead, the line should be
drawn as clearly as possible in advance and in an effective manner. The sanction
against the department does that. It does not jump on the head of an individual
when the problem is the gradual slide of a large number. It affects the higher
officials most able to draw the line for all concerned and powerfully motivates
them to do it.
5. The Quid Pro Quo: Surrender the Exclusionary Rule
The civil penalty proposal sets up a contract with the courts. As indicated by
Chief Justice Burger in his eloquent critique of the exclusionary rule, a legislatively
formulated option might be substitutable for the exclusionary rule should one
arise.'97 California Senate Bill 728, as introduced on March 3, 1993, proposed an
option that was within the control of the courts and exercisable in every case where
the exclusionary rule might apply.'98 California Senate Bill 728 is scheduled to
sunset unless affirmatively extended or unless the court implements its terms as a
substitute for the exclusionary rule. However, there is enough time allotted before
the bill's sunset to allow court consideration of it as a categorical option. The
proposal constitutes an offer by the legislative branch to the judicial: here is a
better way to do it; we have given you substantial control over it; will you accept
it in lieu? Such an offer serves as a bridge between otherwise separate branches
that must communicate and agree on matters which interrelate.
XII. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
A. The Surprising Reversal of Expected Positions
As noted above, the civil penalty in equity option to the exclusionary rule was
drafted in bill form by this author and introduced in the California legislature in
197. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,421-24
(Burger, J., dissenting). However, note that the Chief Justice has advocated the expansion of the good
faith exception, essentially suggesting no bona fide substitute for the exclusionary rule, while properly
criticizing the Congress and state legislatures for failing to provide such an option. See id. at 420-22
(Burger, J., dissenting). The implication of the dissent is that should such an option be presented, the
exclusionary rule should properly yield to it.
198. See Cal. S. 728.
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1993. The measure was heard before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May
18, 1993 and failed by two votes to win passage to the floor.2"u On June 2, 1993,
the proposed bill was amended and all exclusionary rule provisions were
removed.201
The political line-up for and against the measure has been counterintuitive and
baffling. One would think that a remedy which could more effectively redress,
halt, and deter police transgressions would bring the support of the civil liberties
community. Ironically, the opposite was the case.2"e However, law and order
Republican Committee members, presented with a remedy which would remove the
exclusionary rule and substitute a much more powerful and clearly effective
disincentive to police constitutional breaches, voted for the bill.2 3 Liberal
Democrats voted against the bill.2" One logical conclusion exists: the
exclusionary rule has achieved reified status as an object of obeisance or a symbol
of scorn quite apart from its serious consequences.
B. Accommodation to the Exclusionary Rule
There is another explanation for the particularly disappointing Pavlovian
defense of the exclusionary rule by persons allegedly defending civil liberties.
Many of the visible collateral costs of the exclusionary rule have been
accommodated through its many years of imposition. The number of guilty
defendants who are convicted and then set free to commit highly visible crimes is
not large.2°" As discussed above, most of the costs from failure to apply criminal
sanctions occur in prefiling or pretrial stages where they are not visible or are
199. See id. Originally the bill was introduced as California Senate Bill 1122 by Senator Presley in
199 1, S. 1122, x Leg., 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991), and reintroduced in 1993 as California Senate
Bill 728 by Senator Presley, Cal. S. 728.
200. See Official California Legislative Information, Bill Information, 1993-1994 (visited Feb. 10,
1999) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_0701-
0750/sb_728_vote_930518_000001_sen comm>.
201. See Cal. S. 728 (amended June 2, 1993). California Senate Bill 728 was eventually enacted in
September 1994 without any provisions regarding evidence and the exclusionary rule. See OFFICIAL
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, BILL INFORMATION, 1993-1994, HISTORY (visited Feb. 10,
1999) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_0701-0750/sb_728_billhistory>.
202. See OFFICIALCALIFORNIALEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, BILLINFORMATION, 1993-1994, VOTES
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_0701-
0750/sb_728_vote_930518_000001 sen-comm>.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See John E. Fennelly, Inevitable Discovery, The Exclusionary Rule, and Military Due Process,
131 MIL. L. REV. 109, 129 (1991); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse
Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 43-44 & 44 n.210 (1994). But see, Perin et al., supra note 3,
at 711.
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muddled with other factors.2 °6 Where evidence is excluded at trial, unless there is
a reported case, the outcome is also a mix of evidence and witness credibility; the
impact of a set of facts excluded from the jury may be speculative. There are not
a large percentage of cases amenable to the "Willie Horton" public outrage: a
prisoner freed (for example, by conviction reversal for failure to exclude evidence)
followed by subsequent visible crimes.2 7 Where a reversal occurs, the case usually
may be retried by the prosecution.2' The defendant who may have already served
several years in confinement, may be amenable to a plea bargain for additional time
in custody or may be retried and convicted on allowable evidence.
The courts at trial and appellate levels have considerable expertise in deciding
where constitutional lines are drawn and how the exclusionary rule is to be applied.
Although making up a substantial caseload for crowded dockets, these courts can
handle such cases with relative skill and comfort.
Perhaps most important, virtually every attorney active in the criminal field,
for both prosecution and defense, has considerable experience in exclusionary rule
litigation. States have established procedures for separate motions to be brought
to contest the constitutionality of police investigations.2 9 There is a common view
within the bar and the bench that the facial anomalies of the exclusionary rule have
been somehow accommodated and that there are occasional arbitrary results, but
that the police do care about convictions, which impacts their investigations.
Additionally, the collateral harm of accommodation is moderated by other available
evidence, plea bargaining, or judicial efficiency.211
The criminal defense bar forms a particularly interesting case study of
accommodation. Here, pre-existing expertise and investment combine with a
widespread mind-set about the purpose of trials. Their focus is not on determining
the truth, but on effectuating a contest with important societal benefits. The trial
is a chance for the weak defendant to stand up to the powerful state. The defendant
has few weapons in such a contest. Accordingly, difficulties for the state or
advantages to the defendant are inherently equitable-they tend to mitigate the effect
of the otherwise long odds facing the defendant. In other words, the game is fairer
if the defendant has a better chance. Added to this mind-set is the notion that, in
enforcing constitutional standards, defense counsel can do more than simply test
the case of the state. In addition to presenting facts from the defendant's point of
view, defense counsel can affirmatively advance society's agenda by correcting
perceived constitutional wrongs themselves. Just as the prosecutor may hold
206. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 674-76.
207. See Maclin, supra note 205, at 44n.210.
208. See id. (stating that the exclusionary rule "seldom hinders the prosecution of violent crimes").
209. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
210. See Perrin et al., supra note 3, at 688 (describing a study that found high approval ratings for
the exclusionary rule despite belief in its problems (citing Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the
States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina. The Model, the Study and the Implications,
45 N.C. L. REV. 138, 143 (1966))).
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defendants accountable for violations of law, defense counsel attempts to hold the
police accountable for constitutional violations. Hence, many cases have two
prosecutors, each attempting to advance compliance with the law.
The 1993 proposed exclusionary rule option discussed above in California
posed an interesting conundrum for these groups.2 1  The remedy proposed was
clearly more effective in limiting police constitutional breaches than the
exclusionary rule because the number of cases subject to sanction would increase
substantially, and the remedy would be of much greater import to those determining
public policy than is the exclusionary rule.212 But the American Civil Liberties
Union, in addition to the defense bar, opposed the bill. 2 '3 The statement of
opposition was confusing and confused, but sufficed to sway Democrats on the
Senate Judiciary Committee, with the exception of the bill's Democratic sponsor,
from voting for the bill.
214
XIII. APPENDIX: MODEL BILL DRAFT LANGUAGE
215
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. (a) The Legislature finds that the exclusion of evidence or other
fruits of unconstitutional acts by the state has become the primary means to ensure
the enforcement of constitutional standards in criminal investigations. The
Legislature finds that such sanction is limited to those cases where the exclusionary
rule may be determinative, and that it is indirect, uncertain, and arbitrary in relation
to its purpose of securing constitutional compliance.
(b) The Legislature declares that the function of criminal trials is to ascertain
the truth so that the laws of the state may be accurately and fairly applied. Because
of the exclusionary rule's application, substantial resources and attention in
criminal cases focus on the nature of police procedure, separate and apart from the
guilt of the defendant. In addition, the rule's bar to otherwise probative evidence
sometimes compromises the truth seeking function of the criminal trial.
(c) The Legislature finds that such a remedy impacts the criminal justice
211. See supra Parts XI-XII.
212. See supra Parts XI-XII.
213. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. At the same time, every Republican present on the
Committee voted for the measure. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. Although it would have
substituted a stronger remedy for the exclusionary rule, and accordingly was not supported by any law
enforcement association or interest, it provided a path to remove the exclusionary rule. In a political
environment where the media's sound bite approach has infested legislative decision making, the mere
invocation of that consequence secured their votes.
215. The model bill draft language presented in this Part is largely based on the language of
California Senate Bill 728. See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
system beyond the possible release of guilty defendants or the direct costs involved.
Those effects include preliminary decisions not to prosecute or to accept lesser
pleas to crimes committed based on the anticipated exclusion of evidence. In
addition, they include the possible derogation of constitutional standards because
of antipathy toward the collateral consequences of the exclusionary rule.
(d) The Legislature also acknowledges that the courts themselves are limited
in their own authority to secure constitutional compliance, and that their primary
available means has been the exclusion of evidence within their proceedings. The
decision by courts to exclude has been justified by the failure of the Legislature to
formulate an alternative and superior means for the enforcement of constitutional
standards. The reliance on civil suits for damages is inadequate due to procedural
barriers and the practical unlikelihood of a jury sanctioning police agencies in a
way favoring a criminal defendant.
(e) The Legislature hereby creates a meaningful and enforceable remedy for
violation of federal or state constitutional standards by agents of the state, more
directed at the wrong, within the control of court adjudication and sanction, and
precluding the need for the exclusion of relevant evidence as an ineffective
sanction in its stead.
(f) The Legislature hereby expresses its intent to implement the more effective
sanction of civil penalty assessment against the agency responsible for the
management of persons violating constitutional rights of the citizenry. The intent
of the Legislature is to vest in the courts a more direct, effective, and alternative
remedy in lieu of the exclusionary rule. The Legislature expresses its hope that this
remedy will be accepted by the courts.
(g) The Legislature expresses its intent to file anicus briefs as appropriate to
urge appellate court acceptance of the remedies provided in this act, and the
concomitant removal of the exclusionary rule as a means to enforce constitutional
compliance by police agencies. The Legislature intends the substitution to apply
only to breaches of the constitution, and it is not intended to apply to the court's
generic authority to exclude evidence based on statutory or common law privileges,
or because of the unreliability of evidence sought to be introduced.
SECTION 2. Title 16 (commencing with Section 1700) is added to Part 2 of
the Penal Code, to read:
TITLE 16. EVIDENCE OBTAINED IMPROPERLY
1700. (a) A court shall admit all relevant nonprivileged evidence, and shall
not exclude otherwise admissible evidence from a criminal proceeding because of
the violation of constitutional standards in its acquisition.
(b) Any person may file a civil suit in superior court against any state or local
public agency whose employees or agents have violated the constitutional rights of
any citizen during the course of a criminal investigation. The cause of action shall
be in equity. Where the court finds a violation of constitutional rights to have
occurred, it may do either or both of the following:
(1) Issue an injunction commanding no further violations and award
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restitution.
(2) Impose immediate civil penalties payable by the agency employing or
directing the offender of up to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) per
violation.
(c) Where the violation is in violation of an effective injunction against that
agency, a civil penalty of up to two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) per
violation may be imposed against the agency employing or directing the offender.
(d) The amount of civil penalty imposed by the court shall depend upon the
court's consideration of all of the following factors:
(1) The flagrancy of the violation of constitutional rights.
(2) The degree of intrusion of the state or its agent.
(3) The lack of justification for the intrusion.
(4) Physical harm to persons or property damage occurring as a result of
the unconstitutional intrusion.
(5) The opportunity for a warrant or other permissive process knowingly
and inexcusably avoided by the offender.
(6) The prior record of intrusions by the agency employing or directing
the offender.
(e) Attorneys' fees and costs shall be paid to a prevailing petitioner in an
action under this section.
1701. (a) Where in the course of a criminal trial, a justice, municipal, or
superior court has probable cause to believe a violation of the Constitution may
have been committed by a law enforcement agency relevant to the criminal
proceedings before the court, the court may schedule a hearing in the normal
course, and command the presence of any witnesses as the court may demand.
These proceedings shall be independent of the criminal trial and need not interrupt
or delay pending criminal proceedings. The court may examine witnesses and
conduct his or her own inquiry or may appoint a special prosecutor to conduct an
appropriate investigation and prosecute the hearing. The agency whose behavior
is the subject of the investigation and hearing shall be entitled to notice of the
inquiry and to representation before the court.
(b) Where a special prosecutor is appointed, the court may order his or her
compensation from the budget of the agency under inquiry. The special prosecutor
shall receive reasonable fees and shall be vested with all of the powers of the
Attorney General relevant to the assigned inquiry and hearing.
(c) As a result of such a hearing, the court may exercise those powers
enumerated in Section 1700.
1702. (a) No civil penalties assessed under this title shall be paid by
individuals.
(b) Civil penalties imposed by a court pursuant to this title shall be payable
one-half to the crime victim's Restitution Fund as specified in Section 13960.1 of
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the Government Code, and one-half to the General Fund of the state.
(c) No moneys paid by state or local public agencies assessed under this title
shall be returned to, or supplement the budget of, the agency so assessed.
(d) Review of court decision under this title shall be by writ of ordinary
mandamus, and shall be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.
1703. This title shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2005, and shall
have no force or effect on or after that date, and as of that date is repealed, unless
a later enacted statute, which is enacted before January 1,2004 deletes or extends
that date, or unless the California Supreme Court and federal courts hold that this
title is an acceptable substitute for the judicially created exclusionary rule and
accepts this title as the remedy to be judicially applied in its stead.
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